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Historians have tended to examine right-wing British responses to Adolf Hitler on the
basis of a supposed admiration or political affinity for Nazism. This article argues that the
dilemma which actually split diehard Conservatives was between challenging Germany
before it was too late, and a conviction that Britain lacked the means to do so. Both
positions were predicated on a belief that Britain needed to accelerate rearmament, and
that Nazi Germany posed a direct threat to British power. Ideology is not irrelevant, but
the public statements and actions of diehardMPs reveal that their primarymotivation was
to resist internal and external threats to Britain’s position as a world power. This resulted
in an unprecedented division in diehard ranks over Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy,
though diehard unity on colonial appeasement recalled an older tradition of working
together in defence of the empire.
On the evening of 24 October 1935, a House of Commonsdebate on unemployment was interrupted twice by protestorsseated in the strangers’ gallery. As Brigadier-General Sir Henry
Page Croft began to speak, a ‘young woman . . . threw a shower
of leaﬂets into the chamber’. When another Conservative MP, Henry
Victor Raikes, concluded his speech, an attack on the Labour Party’s
support for disarmament, more leaﬂets were thrown down, accompanied
by shouting: ‘Never again. Those who speak for peace also prepare
for war.’1 The protesters were incited by the two MPs’ complaint
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that the previous debate, on the ‘world crisis’, had given way, at the
insistence of Arthur Greenwood, a former Labour minister, to one
on unemployment. Many Conservatives were favourably disposed to
rearmament, but the outspokenness of Croft and Raikes on this occasion
was more a characteristic of ‘diehard’ Conservatives. Diehards held that
rapid rearmament was essential for the survival of Britain as a world
power, and continued to pressure their government to address the issue
through toNeville Chamberlain’s resignation as primeminister on 10May
1940. The diehards’ conviction that Britain had disarmed to a dangerous
level shaped their attitude to Nazi Germany. It divided their number
on the appeasement of Germany’s territorial ambitions in central and
eastern Europe, and united them in condemnation of any transfer of
former German colonies under British administration. This has largely
been overlooked by historiography on British–German relations, which
has preferred to examine right-wing British responses to Adolf Hitler on
the basis of supposed admiration or political affinity for Nazism.
Diehard MPs numbered around thirty to forty in the 1920s and
1930s, and were distinguished from the rest of the parliamentary party
by regularly being at odds with the front bench over the direction
and aims of party policy. According to Stuart Ball, inter-war diehards
‘typiﬁed fundamental Conservative attitudes . . . It was always clearly
understood that the Party could not lightly consider their alienation or
defection, without also losing a part of its own essential being.’2 Inter-
war diehard Conservatism was the product of a number of disparate
imperialist and right-wing groups active in the Edwardian period, which
held that imperial and domestic decline were linked. Although they
were never fully reconciled to one another, the resulting diversity of
opinion was obscured by what G. C. Webber calls a common ‘defensive
nationalism’.3 Diehards therefore tended to interpret British interests
in sufficiently diverse ways that they lacked intellectual and political
coherence. Yet the diehards’ shared hostility to the succession of post-1918
imperial constitutional reforms, introduced byConservative governments,
or coalition governments dominated by Conservatives, helped to increase
cohesion in their ranks.4 The opening months of 1935 witnessed their
most spectacular clash with the front bench, when diehards marshalled
one of the largest backbench rebellions in the history of the Conservative
Party, against theNationalGovernment’s bill to extend Indian responsible
government.5 In the months that followed, diehards were again at odds
2 Stuart Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party: The Crisis of 1929–1931 (New Haven, 1988), p. 23.
3 G. C. Webber, The Ideology of the British Right, 1918–1939 (London, 1986), pp. 5–6, 19–25.
4 N. C. Fleming, ‘Diehard conservatism, mass democracy, and Indian constitutional reform, c. 1918–
35’, Parliamentary History, 32/2 (2013), pp. 350–2; Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The
Empire in British Politics, c. 1880–1932 (London, 2000), p. 164; H. V. Raikes, ‘Toryism – the one hope:
purge us of the traitors in our midst’, Saturday Review, 23 Dec. 1933, pp. 653–4; David Woodford,
‘The British empire and the future’, Indian Empire Review, 5/10 (1936), pp. 363–6.
5 GrahamStewart,BuryingCaesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party (London,
1999), pp. 188–9.
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with their party leadership over Britain’s military preparedness for a
potential war in Europe.
In his essay on Viscount Rothermere and appeasement, Paul Addison
claims that the press baron faced the ‘classic dilemma of the die-hard
Right’, in that individuals could simultaneously admire ‘Fascism as a
bulwark against Bolshevism’, but also fear ‘that Hitler would undermine
Britain’s [global] position’.6 Rothermere might have held ‘diehard’
opinions on many issues, but he was never formally a Conservative or
recognized as such by the party leadership and most MPs. He had a
reputation for erratic and unpredictable political affiliations, to David
Lloyd George in the early 1920s, Oswald Mosley a decade later, and the
Hungarian government in the 1930s, the latter inﬂuencing his attitude
to Germany. Rather than the dilemma identiﬁed by Addison, the public
statements of diehard MPs reveal a different predicament. All diehards
believed that Britain needed to rearm to more adequate levels, and that
Germany posed a direct threat to British power. The problem arose from
how to respond to these bare facts. For a sizeable minority, Britain could
only preserve its great power status by checking German aggrandizement
in Europe. A majority, however, supported Chamberlain’s policy of
appeasement, on the assumption that conﬂict with Germany, even if
Britain emerged victorious, would weaken British power to the advantage
of other rivals. This dilemma was hardly remarkable, for it was the same
quandary faced by all Conservatives and foreign policymakers.7
The veteranMP,Colonel JohnGretton, spoke for a signiﬁcantminority
of diehards in depicting Germany as an existential threat to Britain and
its empire. In contrast, his long-time ally, Croft, argued that Britain did
not possess adequate armaments to challenge the revision of Germany’s
eastern borders. Both men still demanded rapid rearmament, with
Croft contending that this should be offensive not defensive. And all
diehards were united in condemning any deal which ‘returned’ colonies
to Germany. It has been argued that Nazi Germany was ‘a “sounding
board” that the British right neither could nor wanted to ignore’, but in
the case of diehard MPs, it is important to note that public commentary
on Nazi ideology, or even expressions of admiration, are conspicuous
by their relative absence.8 The diehards’ profound anxiety about British
decline meant that they were largely indifferent to the Nazis’ internal
policy, except when they used its racism or autocracy to condemn deals
with Hitler’s government. This is not to rule out the possibility that
diehard ranks might have contained a few Nazi sympathizers and crypto-
fascists, but their overriding ideological concern, which animated diehard
6 Paul Addison, ‘Patriotism under pressure: Lord Rothermere and British foreign policy’, in Chris
Cooke and Gillian Peele (eds), The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918–1939 (London, 1975), pp. 189–208,
at p. 94.
7 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conﬂict from
1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), pp. xix–xx.
8 Dan Stone, Reponses to Nazism in Britain, 1933–1939: Before War and Holocaust (Basingstoke,
2003), p. 114.
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Conservatism from the Edwardian period through to the Second World
War, waswith internal and external threats to Britain’s position as a global
power.
I
John Charmley’s biography of the diehard peer, Lord Lloyd, notes
that its subject opposed Indian self-government and Hitler, but that
if ‘he is remembered at all by historians it tends to be because
he was associated with causes which were associated with [Winston]
Churchill’.9 In a like manner, diehards as a group receive scant or
imprecise treatment in historiography, especially inter-war diehard MPs,
and particularly on the controversial topic of appeasement. A recent
popular account of anti-appeasers, for example, claims that Gretton
was a ‘fervent supporter of Chamberlain and appeasement’, despite
the fact that he deﬁed the party whips in parliamentary divisions on
Munich and Norway.10 The scholarly contributions of Maurice Cowling
and Richard Griffiths note several individual diehards, but they make
no reference to the cohort or the division of opinion therein.11 Martin
Gilbert and Richard Gott brieﬂy mention the diehards’ opposition
to colonial appeasement, but do not comment on their attitudes to
the broader policy.12 R. A. C. Parker also acknowledges the diehards’
determination ‘to surrender no inch of British territory’, adding that they
were ‘zealous supporters of Chamberlainite appeasement, indeed, often
more determined Chamberlainites than Chamberlain himself’.13 This
overstatement is corrected, albeit in equally brief references, in studies by
Webber, Carl Bridge and Graham Stewart.14 The importance of British
armaments to diehard positions on appeasement remains ignored, even
though it is ﬂagged up in accessible primary source material such as
Hansard, the memoirs of Churchill and Croft, and even the cartoons
of David Low.15 That diehards, as a group, have been overlooked, is not
altogether surprising, given that the study of backbenchConservatives is a
9 John Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire (London, 1987), p. 1.
10 Lynn Olson, Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power in 1940 and
Helped to Save Britain (London, 2007), p. 350.
11 Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy 1933–1940 (Chicago,
1975); Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933–9
(London, 1980).
12 Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London, 1963), pp. 88–90.
13 R. A. C. Parker,Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the SecondWorld
War (Basingstoke, 1993), pp. 321–2.
14 Webber, Ideology, pp. 46–8; Carl Bridge, Holding India to the Empire: The British Conservative
Party and the 1935 Constitution (New Delhi, 1986), p. 139; Stewart, Burying, p. 333;
15 David Low, ‘Foreign policy vaudeville act’, Evening Standard, 10 Dec. 1937. Low also got the
measure of diehards on colonial appeasement, see, ‘Low’s topical budget’, Evening Standard, 25 Sept.
1937;Winston S. Churchill, The SecondWorldWar, I: The Gathering Storm (rev. edn, London, 1949),
pp. 74, 76; Henry Page Croft,My Life of Strife (London, 1948).
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relatively recent innovation.16 A pioneering example of this approach, N.
J. Crowson’s Facing Fascism, declines to treat the diehards as a distinct
group worthy of analysis.17 In contrast, Richard Carr’s examination
of another well-deﬁned body of Conservative MPs, veterans of the
Great War, charts how shared wartime experience disposed them to
championing progressive or radical ideas on domestic reform, but failed
to maintain the cohort’s unity on foreign policy.18 In a like manner, the
Conservative MPs who held senior positions in the League of Nations
Union reacted in different and complex ways to that organization’s Peace
Ballot in 1934–5.19
If diehards are relatively absent in studies of appeasement, the
converse holds for examinations of the inter-war far right.20 Unlike most
scholarship on international affairs in the 1930s, the attitudes of right-
wing politicians and other prominent ﬁgures are often considered through
the lens of ideology.21 It is generally accepted that the ideas of British
fascism and diehard Conservatism have a common origin, in domestic
rather than European politics, and in particular, the Edwardian radical
right and diehard peers. Historians of the inter-war period have tended
to highlight individuals, such as Viscount Lymington, the Conservative
MP for Basingstoke, who converted to fascism, as well as diehards who
gave speeches which appear to defend the Nazi government, or who had
degrees of contact with British fascists. The problems of this approach,
in particular the tendency to infer, rather than demonstrate, wider and
deeper contacts between the Conservative Party and fascism, are detailed
by PhilipWilliamson.22 Moreover, the assumption that right-wing politics
shades from the centre to the extreme right, on a continuum, can all too
easily overlook the ways in which fascism diametrically opposed many
fundamental principles and values of British Conservatism, particularly
16 Stuart Ball, Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain, 1918–1945 (Oxford, 2013), pp.
307–90.
17 N. J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators 1935–1940
(London, 1997), pp. 74–7, 109–11.
18 Richard Carr, Veteran MPs and Conservative Politics in the Aftermath of the Great War: The
Memory of All That (Aldershot, 2013), p. 168.
19 Helen McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and
Internationalism, c. 1918–45 (Manchester, 2011), pp. 50, 56–62.
20 W. A. Rudlin, The Growth of Fascism in Great Britain (London, 1935), pp. 115–17, 131–2; David
Baker, ‘The extreme right in the 1920s: fascism in a cold climate, or “conservatismwith knobs on”?’, in
Mike Cronin (ed.),The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition
(London, 1996), p. 18; Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: From Oswald Mosley’s Blackshirts to the
National Front (London, 1998); Martin Pugh, ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts’: Fascists and Fascism in
Britain between the Wars (London, 2005). pp. 3–5, 32–3.
21 G.Bruce Strang, ‘The spirit ofUlysses? Ideology andBritish appeasement in the 1930s’,Diplomacy
and Statecraft, 19/3 (2008), pp. 481–526.
22 Philip Williamson, ‘The Conservative Party, fascism and anti-fascism 1918–1939’, in Nigel
Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz (eds), Varieties of Anti-Fascism: Britain in the Inter-War Period
(Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 73–97. See also John Stevenson, ‘Conservatism and the failure of fascism in
interwar Britain’, in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the
Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe (London, 1990), pp. 264–82.
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on the role of the state and individual freedom.23 None of the seventy-
nine Conservative MPs who voted against the 1935 India bill joined the
pro-Nazi Right Club. Indeed, its founder, Archibald Ramsay, MP for
Peebles and Southern Midlothian, was not part of the diehard rebellion
against the India bill. Only two diehardMPs were members of the Anglo-
German Fellowship. None appear to have been involved with ‘the Link’.24
A number of diehards, such as the young MP for Mid-Bedfordshire,
Alan Lennox-Boyd, were involved with Mosley’s January Club, which
arranged dinners to bring British fascists into contact with the political
establishment. However, the club included National Labour and centrist
Conservative MPs, as well as Zionists, with an interest in or admiration
for Italian fascism. It was careful to distance itself from Nazism and did
not survive Mosley’s fall from grace. Like many Conservatives, Lennox-
Boyd regarded Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, but the
most youthful of diehard MPs was no less typical for being ‘repelled by
the brutality of the Nazis’.25
Even outside parliament, among right-wing pressmen, opinion was not
necessarily dictated by ideological affinity.26 Howell Gwynne, editor of
the diehard Morning Post, and a well-known anti-Semite, took a strong
line against Germany throughout the inter-war period.27 The picture is
further complicated by liberal papers, such as the Manchester Guardian,
joining the diehards in opposing colonial restitution, albeit expressing
in stronger terms their ‘abhorrence’ of the Nazi regime.28 This is not
to suggest that ideology is irrelevant to understanding diehard attitudes
to Nazi Germany, but to caution against too narrow a reading of what
this means in practice. Diehards were ﬁrst and foremost activated by
profound concern for British greatness, under siege from without and
within. Attitudes to other countries ﬂowed from this position, and in the
case of Nazi Germany, resulted in a division of opinion on the basis of
whether war would arrest or exacerbate British decline.
The diehards’ belief in maintaining what they regarded as Conservative
ﬁrst principles, and the declinist assumptions on which their outlook
was based, marked them out from their backbench colleagues, but
it did not isolate them completely. Croft helped lead the Empire
Industries Association, to promote tariff reform, following requests
23 Ball, Portrait, p. 80; N. C. Fleming, ‘Political extremes and extremist politics’, Political Studies
Review, 12/3 (2014), pp. 395–401.
24 Pugh, Hurrah, pp. 192, 280–1; Crowson, Facing, p. 207; Griffiths, Fellow, pp. 307–17.
25 Philip Murphy, Alan Lennox-Boyd: A Biography (London, 1999), p. 43.
26 Addison, ‘Patriotism’, pp. 189–208; Alan Foster, ‘The Beaverbrook press and appeasement: the
second phase’, European History Quarterly, 21/1 (1991), pp. 5–38.
27 Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and Germany 1936–1939 (Oxford, 1971), pp. 49–50;
Elspeth Y. O’Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis (Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 73, 89; John Charmley,
Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London, 1989), p. 157. A dissenting account claims that Gwynne
‘encouraged and supported Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement’, see Janet Dack, ‘ “It certainly isn’t
cricket!” Media responses to Mosley and the BUF’, in Copsey and Olechnowicz (eds), Varieties, pp.
141–61.
28 Gannon, British, pp. 29–30.
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from Neville Chamberlain and Leopold Amery.29 At the height of
the controversy over Indian constitutional reform, Raikes was elected
secretary of the studiously uncontroversial 1922 Committee, and other
diehard MPs participated actively in backbench committees.30 As Brian
Girvin observes, ‘Whatever sympathy there may have been between the
conservative and radical right in terms of their relationship to capitalism,
monarchy and religion, the determining difference between them is the
acceptance or rejection of liberal democracy.’31 Attitudes to ‘race’ can
be added to this list. The diehards’ willingness to employ racial slurs,
to justify opposing concessions to colonial nationalists, was a product
of ‘cultural provincialism’ rather than a systematic racist doctrine like
Nazism.32 Diehard MPs displayed no interest in the eugenics movement,
despite its growing international proﬁle in the late 1920s and early
1930s, nor did Britain’s Eugenics Society seek to win diehards over to
its cause.33 Rather, diehard attitudes to race were deeply imbued with
paternalism, and by the 1930s, even drew partially on emerging ideas of
humanitarianism.34
In choosing to operate within the Conservative Party, as a minority,
diehards could only exercise inﬂuence if they managed to garner support
on the backbenches which exceeded their total number, and then only
in a sufficient quantity to embarrass the front bench. This happened if
diehards succeeded in creating what Bill Schwarz labels ‘authentic crises
of Conservatism’, when ‘national sentiment points one way, and the
requirements of state management point another.’35 Most backbenchers
were wary of siding with the diehards, even if they sympathized with
their outlook on particular issues, and this has led historians to dismiss
the idea of diehard inﬂuence, or to suggest that it was largely conﬁned
to propaganda.36 It is clear that even signiﬁcant diehard revolts did not
veto legislation, but on occasion these could manufacture political crises
29 Robert Self, Neville Chamberlain: A Biography (Aldershot, 2006), p. 79; Larry L. Witherell, ‘Sir
Henry Page Croft and Conservative backbench campaigns for empire, 1903–1932’, Parliamentary
History, 25 (2006), p. 368.
30 1922 Committee, minutes, 10 Dec. 1934, vol. 3, March 1934–July 1938, Conservative Party
Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1922/3; Stuart Ball, ‘The 1922 Committee: the formative years
1922–45’, Parliamentary History, 9/1 (1990), pp. 129–57. The author would like to thank the 1922
Committee for granting access to its minute books.
31 Brian Girvin, The Right in the Twentieth Century: Conservatism and Democracy (London,
1994), p. 80.
32 Paul B. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1990), p. 5.
33 Bradley W. Hart and Richard Carr, ‘Sterilization and the British Conservative Party: rethinking
the failure of the Eugenics Society’s political strategy in the nineteen-thirties’, Historical
Research (published online 24 Sept. 2014).
34 Fleming, ‘Diehard conservatism’, pp. 352–5.
35 Bill Schwarz, ‘Politics and rhetoric in the age ofmass culture’,HistoryWorkshop Journal, 46 (1998),
pp. 129–59, at pp. 131, 154; Fleming, ‘Diehard conservatism’, p. 341.
36 Headlam, diary, 21Oct. 1936, in Stuart Ball (ed.),Parliament andPolitics in the Age of Churchill and
Attlee: TheHeadlamDiaries 1935–1951 (Cambridge, 1999), p. 95;MauriceCowling, Impact of Labour
1920–1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 84–7; John Darwin,
‘Fear of falling: British politics and imperial decline since 1800’, Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society, 5th ser., 36 (1986), pp. 27–43; Thompson, Imperial, pp. 163−64; Philip Williamson,National
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that might delay reform, cause legislation to be amended, or circumscribe
the party leader’s room for manoeuvre. Backbench subject committees
helped to amplify diehard voices, as did party caucuses and an often
sympathetic hearing in the populist right-wing press.37 However, these
were merely channels of communication and not sufficient in themselves
to provoke a crisis. As Ball argues, ‘It was only if events should conﬁrm
their constant complaints, or if their outlook on any major issue should
come to be widely shared within the Parliamentary Party, that a crisis
would emerge.’38
The core cohort of diehard MPs remained remarkably constant
throughout the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, at around thirty to forty
MPs. The need for precision means that diehards are deﬁned using key
parliamentary votes. This helps to distinguish them from Conservative
MPs who agreed with their outlook, especially on single issues, but who
took no action to express their doubts or objections. As the 1935 rebellion
on India doubled the size of those labelled ‘diehards’, to seventy-nine, it
is useful to distinguish between ‘core diehards’ and ‘India diehards’. Even
here, caution is required when examining the late 1930s; the claim made
by Bridge, for example, that ‘only 10 per cent of the Indian diehards voted
against Neville Chamberlain inMay 1940’, overlooks the sizeable number
not returned to parliament at the 1935 general election.39 This observation
aside, it is noteworthy that both cohorts exhibit similar voting patterns in
key parliamentary divisions on appeasement. The larger cohort of India
diehards shrank by twenty-six MPs by the time of the Norway vote in
1940; the smaller core diehard cohort – based on a parliamentary division
on India held on 3 December 1931 – was also reduced by a third after
the 1935 general election. Amongst the India diehards, nine abstained on
the 1938 Anglo-Italian Agreement; eleven abstained onMunich, fourteen
abstained on Norway, and four voted against the government in that
landmark division. Of the core diehards, two abstained on the Anglo-
Italian Agreement, six abstained on Munich, the same ﬁgure abstained
on Norway, and two voted against Chamberlain. The remainder in each
cohort supported the government. In both cases, a quarter deﬁed the
government onMunich, and dissentients increased noticeably between the
parliamentary divisions on Munich and Norway.
This article examines how diehard Conservatives responded to the
appeasement of Nazi Germany. Section II charts how diehards helped
to extend opposition to colonial restitution beyond parliament. Section
Crisis andNational Government: British Politics, the Economy, and the Empire, 1926–1932 (Cambridge,
1992), p. 124. For similar argument about Churchill in the 1930s, see R. A. C. Parker, Churchill and
Appeasement (London, 2000), p. 179.
37 Ball, ‘1922 Committee’, p. 140; Ian St John, ‘Writing to the defence of empire: Winston Churchill’s
press campaign against constitutional reform in India, 1929–1935’, in Chandrika Kaul (ed.), Media
and the British Empire (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 108–19.
38 Ball, Baldwin, p. 23. For extended treatment see Ball, Portrait, pp. 339–49.
39 Bridge,Holding, p. 139. Bridge cites J. Ramussen, ‘Government and intra-party opposition: dissent
within the Conservative Party in the 1930s’, Political Studies, 19/2 (1971), pp. 172–83, at p. 178, n. 2.
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III addresses rearmament, as well as British relations with Ireland, Spain
and Italy, in so far as these had a bearing on policy towards Germany.
Section IV examines diehard responses to the crises of 1938–40. This
research utilizes the voting behaviour of diehard MPs, as well as the
speeches of those who identiﬁed themselves to, and were called by, the
Speaker of the House of Commons.Most diehardMPs did not contribute
to parliamentary debates on any topic. Lack of ability, conﬁdence,
inclination, or a preference for the more encouraging atmosphere of
parliamentary committees, are all likely explanations.40 This was not a
recent innovation, or peculiar to debates concerning Nazi Germany, as
it was entirely in keeping with diehard behaviour since the early 1900s. It
meant that the task of representing diehard views in the Commons was
left to a small number of spokesmen. Two of the most consistent bearers
of this responsibility, since the Edwardian parliaments, were Croft and
Gretton, which made their contrasting views on appeasing Germany all
the more signiﬁcant.
II
Diehard opposition to the restitution of former German colonies under
British administration was consistent with their customary objection to
anything perceived as a diminution of British imperial power. It also
reﬂected strategic concerns about German access to African ports and
the potential for submarines to interfere with British shipping. German
governments throughout the 1920s and early 1930s demanded equal
access to League of Nations mandates. British, dominion and other
colonial powers resisted this, but pressure from the German settler lobby
ensured that successive German ministries continued to press the issue.
Hitler ﬁrst raised the return of colonies at his meeting with Sir John
Simon, in March 1935. The foreign secretary’s cool response contrasted
with the preparedness of other colonial powers to discuss the matter.
Hitler’s ﬁrst public pronouncement on the colonies came in the wake
of the remilitarization of the Rhineland, on 7 March 1936, and was
reiterated months later in his Nuremberg speech of 9 September. The
Nazis moved towards demanding restitution as of right. The British
government indicated that it could only consider the matter as part of
a general settlement.41
It is hardly surprising that diehards objected to such a deal. But the
suggestion that opposition from ordinary Conservatives was inevitable
takes for granted that they held strong feelings about the relatively recent
British-administered mandate of Tanganyika and the South African
mandate of South-West Africa.42 Certainly, over a dozen local divisions
40 Richard Toye, ‘The rhetorical culture of the House of Commons after 1918’, History, 99/335
(2014), pp. 270–98.
41 Wolfe W. Schmokel, Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919–1945 (New Haven, 1964), pp.
76–136.
42 Crowson, Facing, pp. 74, 109.
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passed resolutions opposing colonial appeasement, but it was hardly
enough to sustain a campaign. The diehards, and some otherConservative
MPs, ampliﬁed this at the annual party caucuses, which, alongside tabling
early day motions in the House of Commons, constituted their strategy in
opposing colonial appeasement. Taken together, it hinted at the 1933–5
campaign on India, but it was hardly a repeat of that crusade. Nothing
was established resembling the India Empire Society or India Defence
League. Even the former’s journal, which continued through toDecember
1939, declined to address the issue; Croft’s contribution inNovember 1936
was instead on the need for coordinated imperial defence.43 Individual
speakers might address local constituency associations and branches, but
colonial appeasement did not gain the attention of ordinary members
in the same way as India. The minutes of the Lancashire and Cheshire
Division of the Conservative Party give some idea of the contrast.
Whereas India regularly featured in the early to mid-1930s, reﬂecting its
importance to the region’s cotton industry, there is no reference to colonial
appeasement.44 Even so, another explanation for the lack of energetic
organizing on this issue is that there was no ﬁrm proposal, and that
giving Germany territory at the expense of the British empire was simply
unconscionable to most Conservatives. In contrast, the 1935 India Act
did not surrender the Raj but reformed it; diehards struggled to convince
a majority of Conservatives otherwise.
Diehards were not alone in resolutely opposing colonial appeasement,
though they naturally became strongly associated with the campaign
of opposition. Croft was one of its three leading spokesmen, alongside
Duncan Sandys and Leo Amery. Signiﬁcant weight was leant to the cause
by Austen Chamberlain and Churchill. The campaign was launched in
the wake of a Commons debate, on 5 February 1936, in which the former
Labour leader, George Lansbury, argued for an international conference
to arbitrate on opening access to mandates more equally. He hoped that
this would lessen international tension by providing a fairer distribution of
raw materials and destinations for emigration. In the same debate, Lloyd
George questioned the right of Britain to treat its mandates as if they
were British territory, and argued that the government should reconsider
its attitude for the sake of peace.45 On 10 February, Sandys tabled an
early day motion, signed by forty-seven other MPs, which opposed the
transfer of any mandates.46 Two days later, Croft challenged the colonial
secretary, National Labour’s J. H. Thomas, to give an assurance that the
government ‘had not considered, and was not considering, the handing
over of any of the British Colonies, either under mandate or otherwise to
a foreign power, and that they were not prepared to make British Colonies
43 Henry Page Croft, ‘Empire unity – defence’, Indian Empire Review, 5/11 (1936), pp. 398–400.
44 Lancashire and Cheshire Division Minutes, 1932–65, Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian
Library, Oxford ARE/3/1/2.
45 The Times, 6 Feb. 1936, pp. 7, 14.
46 Ibid., 12 Feb. 1936, p. 14.
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the subject of barter in any world conference’.47 Satisﬁed with Thomas’s
response, Sandys subsequently withdrew the motion, though the episode
failed to quell anxiety among British settlers in East Africa.48 On 9
March, following the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, the British
government secretly commissioned the earl of Plymouth to investigate
the issue. Plymouth concluded that it would be impractical and worthless
to transfer mandates to Germany, but the secrecy surrounding the issue
encouraged continued unrest amongst concerned Conservatives.49 On 6
April, Sandys and Lennox-Boyd questioned the prime minister, Stanley
Baldwin, about a recent speech given by a junior minister, which indicated
that the government had become favourable to colonial restitution.50
Baldwin ﬂatly denied the suggestion, but a month later he was again
pressed, this time by a delegation from his party’s Imperial Affairs
Committee.51
At the Conservatives’ annual Central Council on 24 June, Croft
moved, on behalf of his Bournemouth constituency association, a motion
seconded by Sandys, which ‘called upon the Government to resist any
proposals which might tend to weaken the integrity of the Empire and
urged that all possible steps should be taken to promote the lasting unity
of all its component parts’. Croft went on to refer to ‘dictators with
expansionist tendencies’, and ‘war tyrants of the world . . . out to grab
territories’. But rather than condemn Hitler’s peace offer, Croft instead
attacked ‘Socialist leaders’ who proposed handing over the mandates
to the League. Two speakers queried Britain’s right to hold on to
mandates indeﬁnitely, but the mood of the meeting was clear when
Croft’s motion was passed ‘by an overwhelming majority’.52 On 3 July
Croft signed a letter to the press, along with Amery, Sandys and nine
other MPs, demanding that their government follow the example of the
dominion governments, by giving an assurance of their ‘unwillingness
to consider any such cession’.53 On 16 July Baldwin was obliged to
dampen concerns in the Commons. These were raised following an
interview given by a visiting South African defence minister, in which he
suggested that ‘inﬂuential persons’ in Britain were in favour of ‘colonial
compensation’. Baldwin denied that this referred to British ministers,
but declined to ‘amplify’ his views on the subject despite interventions
by Croft and Churchill.54 On the same day, Baldwin received another
47 Ibid., 13 Feb. 1936, p. 6.
48 Ibid., 15 Feb. 1936, p. 11.
49 Crowson, Facing, pp. 75–6.
50 House of Commons Debates, 6 April 1936, vol. 310, col. 2415.
51 Amery, diary, 7 May 1936, in John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds), The Empire at Bay: The
Leo Amery Diaries 1929–1945 (London, 1988), p. 416.
52 The Times, 25 June 1936, p. 13. See also Daily Mirror, 25 June 1936, p. 13; Amery, diary, 24 June
1936, Empire at Bay, p. 422.
53 Scotsman, 6 July 1936, p. 13.
54 The Times, 17 July 1936, p. 14.
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delegation on the mandates; he informed them that the difficulties of
returning colonies meant that it was ‘almost impossible’.55
After a meeting of the party’s Foreign Affairs committee, also on 16
July, Sandys indicated to Amery that he had drawn up a new ‘memorial
demanding a clear assurance on the mandated territories question’.56
Tabled as an early day motion a week later, it secured 117 signatures,
the ﬁrst four of which were Sandys, Croft, Austen Chamberlain, and
Churchill.57 Diehard names were conspicuous; only one of the India
diehards, who later abstained on Munich, Major John Courtauld, did
not add his name. Anthony Eden presented the government’s position
when he addressed the Commons on 27 July, acknowledging that access
to the mandates’ raw materials might be open to discussion, but repeating
previous statements about the ‘grave difficulties, moral, political and legal,
of which His Majesty’s Government must frankly say that they have been
unable to ﬁnd any solution’.58 Neville Chamberlain, Viscount Halifax and
Sir SamuelHoare, who all favoured territorial concessions, had previously
insisted that the foreign secretary’s statement should ‘convince Hitler that
the door was open to future negotiations’.59 Privately, Eden was disposed
to considering South West Africa for transfer.60 Ministers appear to have
believed that Hitler was genuinely concerned about Germany’s former
colonies, and assumed that their contact, Hjalmar Schacht, a veteran
campaigner on the question, had ‘more inﬂuence over the Nazi regime
than he had in reality’.61 The minutes of the 1922 Committee meeting held
after Eden’s statement reveal the confusion and concern of backbench
Conservatives.62
In advance of the party conference of 1–3 October, Sandys and Croft
maintained their pressure by giving notice of a motion. This sought
assurance from the government that its position had not changed since
Simon’s March 1935 statement. A compromise amendment was also
touted, described by Amery in his diary as ‘feeble’, and ‘put forward
at Government instigation’.63 It stated that any decision on mandates
rested with the League council and the relevant mandatory powers, that
the British government would not initiate this process, and that it would
not take any action without full discussion in parliament. At the party
conference in Margate, Sandys proposed his motion and was seconded
55 Crowson, Facing, pp. 75–6.
56 Amery, diary, 16 July 1936, Empire at Bay, p. 425.
57 Notice of Early Day Motion, 22 July 1936, no. 128, pp. 2881–4, House of Commons Library.
58 House of Commons Debates, 27 July 1936, vol. 315, col. 1132.
59 Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939 (Oxford, 2011),
pp. 305–6.
60 A. L. Kennedy, diary, 30 June 1936, Gordon Martel (ed.), The Times and Appeasement: The
Journals of A. L. Kennedy, 1932–1939 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 235–6.
61 Scott Newton, Proﬁts of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement (Oxford,
1996), p. 77.
62 1922 Committee, minutes, 27 July 1936, vol. 3,March 1934–July 1938, Conservative Party Archive,
Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1922/3.
63 The Times, 1 Oct. 1936, p. 12; Amery diary, 1 Oct. 1936, Empire at Bay, p. 427.
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by Croft. Hoare replied on behalf of the government, claiming that
their position had not changed, but also indicating that they could not
elaborate further due to the ‘present delicate international situation’.
The First Lord of the Admiralty’s conclusion, that the ‘passing of the
resolution . . . could not make them any more cautious than they were
already’, was ignored by delegates, who on a show of hands defeated
the amendment and carried Sandys and Croft’s resolution ‘by a large
majority, amid cheers’.64 As the one-time secretary of state for India who
had steered through the 1935 Act, Hoare was familiar with such displays
of imperialistic deﬁance at party conferences, and the possibility that these
might escalate into major party crises.
Government assurances aside, in February 1937, the British held secret
conversations with the French on the possibility of Schacht’s ideas on
economic access to colonies forming part of a peace deal.65 Diehards
and others remained suspicious about their government’s intention,
especially as Nazi speeches continued to mention colonial restitution.66
In an early day motion dated 15 February, ninety-seven signatories –
including Croft, Gretton and other diehards – pointedly noted ‘with
satisfaction the assurance given by His Majesty’s Government that they
are not considering the cession of any colonial or mandated territory’.67
A week later, Croft addressed an empire unity meeting at Swindon,
declaring that Germany could only re-enter Africa if it abandoned
submarines, ended conscription and reduced its air power by 75 per cent,
‘to prove once and for all that she stands with the British Empire for a
new world order of non-aggression’.68 A meeting the following month,
between Eden and Joachim von Ribbentrop, produced an increasingly
shrill reaction in Germany to the British foreign secretary’s refusal to
countenance the transfer of mandates.69 Nazi demands for restitution, as
of right, effectively ended Franco-British hopes of colonial appeasement
as part of a peace deal. Even Hitler let the issue rest, realizing that it
might mean compromising on Austria and Czechoslovakia, although it
continued to feature in his public speeches.70 As prime minister from
May 1937, Chamberlain nevertheless remained open to the possibility
of a deal if the Germans were forthcoming, though he looked to other
governments to make sacriﬁces.71 As British representatives informed the
Imperial Conference at London, on 2 June, transferring British mandates
would create a crisis that might bring down the government, therefore
64 The Times, 2 Oct. 1936, p. 8. See also, Daily Mirror, 2 Oct. 1936, p. 6.
65 Schmokel, Dream, p. 100.
66 Jones to Lady Grigg, 12 Feb. 1937, in Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters 1931–1950 (London,
1954), p. 313.
67 Notice of Early Day Motion, 15 Feb. 1937, no. 55, p. 1259, House of Commons Library.
68 The Times, 24 Feb. 1937, p. 8.
69 Ibid., 22 July 1937, p. 14.
70 Schmokel, Dream, pp. 102–4.
71 Charmley, Chamberlain, p. 20.
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the dominion governments should not rule out returning the mandates
assigned to them.72
Chamberlain was not alone in remaining disposed to a peace deal that
included the return of colonies.73 Sections of Liberal and Labour opinion,
prominent peers and clergymen, and the Anglo-German Fellowship, all
promoted the scheme to varying degrees.74 In the last three months of
1937, The Times carried letters on the subject in which ‘opponents were
outnumbered and could only muster Leo Amery and Croft as signiﬁcant
names in their cause.’75 In his contribution, Croft made it clear that on
colonies, ‘some of us differ as to the means by which better relations,
leading to permanent peace, can be obtained.’76 He blamed sections of the
press for encouraging the Germans to demand colonial restitution. Croft
repeated Jan Smuts’s claim that returning Germany’s former African
colonies would give it submarine bases that would affect the security of all
nations, and effectively revived what Germans labelled the ‘colonial guilt
lie’, which the British government had abandoned in 1925.77 Focusing
on South-West Africa, Croft cited a report on the ‘merciless destruction
of the Hereros’, whose population had decreased by over two thirds:
‘It may be that the Nazi regime would be far more enlightened in its
treatment of blacks – let us all hope so; but the most vital test of all is
the safety of the British Empire in Africa and the ultimate peace of the
world.’78 These arguments reiterated those of interest groups representing
British settlers. They also reﬂected strategic concerns aboutmaritime lines
of communication, and Conservative assumptions about the supposedly
inherent paternalism and superiority of British imperialism.79
In his February address to Swindon Conservatives, Croft had claimed
to speak for ‘non-official Conservative opinion’.80 By the time of his
October letter to The Times, he conﬁdently asserted that he spoke
‘for the great mass of the British people as well as the unanimous
National Union of Conservative Associations’.81 This change of self-
appointed status probably reﬂected the support he had received several
weeks beforehand, at the party conference, alongside his frustration
with the lack of opponents making their views clear in the press.
At that conference, on behalf of the Wessex Provincial Area, Croft
moved, and Lennox-Boyd seconded, a motion which, in strong language,
72 Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Appeasement’ and the English Speaking World: Britain, the United States, the
Dominions and the Policy of ‘Appeasement’, 1937–1939 (Cardiff, 1975), p. 38.
73 Charmley, Chamberlain, p. 32.
74 N. C. Fleming,TheMarquess of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in Britain and Ireland
(London, 2005), p. 187; Pugh,Hurrah, p. 272; Andrew Chandler, ‘Munich and morality: the bishops
of the Church of England and appeasement’,Twentieth Century British History, 5/1 (1994), pp. 77–99.
75 Andrew J. Crozier, Appeasement and Germany’s Last Bid for Colonies (London, 1988), pp. 226–7.
76 The Times, 18 Oct. 1937, p. 10.
77 Schmokel, Dream, p. 83.
78 The Times, 18 Oct. 1937, p. 10.
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80 Ibid., 24 Feb. 1937, p. 8.
81 Ibid., 18 Oct. 1937, p. 10.
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returned to the idea of associating the surrender of colonies with
Labour and Liberal ‘sentimentalist’ intellectuals, and bitterly condemned
the idea as economically disastrous and a ‘treacherous betrayal’ of
colonial inhabitants.82 The party conference carried the motion ‘without
opposition’.83 The Times’ Berlin correspondent subsequently reported
that it ‘naturally caused disappointment here and provoked some abusive
comment in the Press’, adding that it would lead to further demands for
the return ofGerman colonies.84 Croft continued to be exercised byBritish
supporters of restitution, even chiding Labour MPs in December 1937
for sending out the wrong signal to Germany by raising the subject in
parliament.85
The British government continued to be prepared to discuss colonies in
its diplomacy with Germany; Halifax raised the issue during his unofficial
visit to Germany in November 1937.86 In January 1938, Chamberlain
indicated his support for a new scheme, at a cabinet subcommittee on
foreign affairs, that placed the burden of transfer on other colonial powers,
especially Belgium and Portugal, with minimal territorial effect on
British possessions: ‘a new regime of colonial administration . . . roughly
corresponding to the conventional zone of the Congo Basin Treaties,
acceptable and applicable to all the Powers concerned on exactly equal
terms’.87 This was communicated to Hitler by the British ambassador to
Berlin on 3 March 1938.88 As with Halifax’s efforts months earlier, Hitler
had no interest in this latest scheme, insisting instead on the return of
German colonies. In the weeks and months that followed, diplomatic
attention moved decisively away from colonies to the Anschluss with
Austria and the Sudeten crisis. The colonial question largely disappeared,
but rather than reassuring Croft and others, the silence encouraged their
anxiety. Having supported the Munich Agreement, Croft subsequently
delivered a speech in his Bournemouth constituency that distinguished
the annexation of the Sudetenland from colonial restitution:
Because Germany has succeeded by strong measures in embracing
Germanic peoples under the rule of the Reich, this is no reason why we
should contemplate paying her Danegeld or handing over territories which
in her hands would prove a strategic menace to the British Empire and
the peace of the world. On the contrary, the very principle which concedes
that people of German race . . . should be included, if they wish, in the
Reich, must deny any such right to coerce native or European peoples in
the colonies into the Germanic system against their wish.89
82 Ibid., 8 Oct. 1937, pp. 8–9.
83 Scotsman, 8 Oct. 1937, p. 12.
84 The Times, 9 Oct. 1937, p. 12.
85 Ibid., 2 Dec. 1937, p. 7.
86 Schmokel, Dream, p. 108.
87 Ibid., pp. 112, 118; Charmley, Chamberlain, p. 45.
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The following month, on 14 November, the diehard MP Brenden
Bracken reopened the controversy by calling on the prime minister to
end the ‘discouragement to development and employment caused by
uncertainty regarding the future Government of Tanganyika and other
African mandates formerly under German rule’. Chamberlain’s response
to this, and other questions, was to refer to Baldwin’s statements in
1936. This encouraged further questions: whether the prime minister was
aware of ‘Nazi propaganda’ in Tanganyika, or a planned visit by a South
African minister to Berlin, and whether he had received representations
from the colonies concerned.90 Afterwards, at the 1922 Committee, the
press reported that those who had supported Chamberlain’s foreign
policy, including Croft, were puzzled and disconcerted by the prime
minister’s statements on the mandates.91 The minutes of the meeting
indicate that the India diehard, Annesley Somerville, vice-chairman of
the committee, who had supported Chamberlain on Munich, was the
ﬁrst of eight to speak against the return of any colonies.92 The result
was another early day motion, containing twenty-nine signatures, mostly
ordinary Conservative MPs, which stated that ‘no British colony or
mandated territory should be transferred toGermanywithout the consent
of the people of Great Britain.’93 The issue thereafter disappeared from
political debate in Britain.94 It was also during this period that widespread
political enthusiasm for appeasement, already under severe strain since
Kristallnacht, withered away as most Conservative MPs looked instead
to accelerated rearmament.
III
Just as diehards were united in opposing colonial appeasement, so they
were at one on the need to accelerate rearmament. Churchill, who had
been their most prominent spokesman on the 1935 India bill, continued
to rally diehard MPs to his side by calling for greater investment in the
Royal Air Force. In principle, the issue enjoyed widespread support in the
party, and it allowed diehard MPs to lay the blame for disarmament at
the door of Labour.95 In practice, diehards were suspicious of their own
government, not least for its equivocation during theWorldDisarmament
Conference at Geneva.96 The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October
1935 led Churchill, Croft, and others on the right, to ally their calls for
90 House of Commons Debates, 14 November 1938, vol. 341, cols 491–493.
91 The Times, 15 Nov. 1938, p. 14.
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94 Schmokel, Dream, pp. 121–4.
95 Raikes to editor, ‘To bomb or not’, Saturday Review, 26 Aug. 1933, p. 232.
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rearmament with support for the League of Nations.97 However, Croft’s
espousal of the League was tepid, and intended to signal his support
for the government. He inevitably broke with Churchill in the months
and years that followed, especially as Churchill’s advocacy of the League
intensiﬁed in the late 1930s, when the Soviet Union enhanced its role on
the League’s council.98 Other diehards had little regard for the League, and
their calls for rearmament were unalloyed to institutions or agreements
that promoted multinational security. Two years before Chamberlain’s
policy of seeking bilateral agreements with Germany, Gretton launched
a scathing attack in the Commons on the 1935 Anglo-German Naval
Agreement.
It ties our hands, but it does not necessarily tie the hands of Germany
. . . Germany is governed by an autocracy and has all the elements of
secrecy in the carrying out of her naval policy. What is to bind Germany to
this Agreement? . . . What Treaty or engagement has Germany kept since
the War? Germany has become almost a professional treaty-breaker. Yet
you have nothing but the word of the German Government to guarantee
the fulﬁlment of this Agreement . . . if you say, ‘We believe the German
Government has not kept its engagements, and we must have an increased
programme,’ you will immediately cause diplomatic repercussions.99
The Admiralty, Gretton argued, ‘had been quite reckless’ in allowing
Germany a submarine ﬂeet, ‘which would give her a power in
submarines far greater than anything possessed by other naval powers’.100
Despite frequently speaking on the subject of armaments, Croft was
conspicuously quiet in this debate. Labour MPs also criticized the
agreement, from a different perspective to that of Gretton, though such
concurrences of opposition encouraged theMP for Burton-upon-Trent to
believe, or claim to believe, that some in the Labour movement supported
strong rearmament, and express this in private to Chamberlain in
January 1937.101
Gretton’s objection to the naval agreement was not the ﬁrst occasion
on which he expressed apprehension about the existential threat posed
by Germany. A fortnight before, he claimed that a recent declaration
by Ireland’s Taosieach, Eamon De Valera, that no foreign power could
use Irish aerodromes, was made in response to statements emanating
from Germany.102 Gretton’s comments were part of a lengthy speech
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98 Parker, Chamberlain, pp. 319–21; Parker, Churchill, p. 117. Thompson notes diehard distaste for
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condemning a succession of concessions to Irish nationalism, which he
blamed for the economic war between Ireland and Britain. Diehard MPs
had been especially activated by the Irish question since the Great War,
and their speeches on this occasion hinted that something decisive needed
to be done to check Fianna Fa´il.103 Not unexpectedly, Croft delivered
a similar history lesson, but he declined to echo Gretton’s concern
about aerodromes.104 Churchill’s contribution focused on recent history,
conveniently overlooking his own role in establishing the Irish Free State.
In striking diehard language, he described relations with Ireland as part
of the ‘perpetual progress of British degeneration’, also manifested in the
‘diminution in arms and defensive security’ and the 1935 India Act.105
The 1938 Anglo-Irish Treaty, in particular its implications for relations
withGermany, produced another cleavage in diehard opinion. Intended to
end the economicwar, it relinquished threeRoyalNavy bases that guarded
the Atlantic approaches to the British Isles. These had been a provision
of the 1921 treaty between the British government and Da´il E´ireann. As
the author of that provision, Churchill led the attack when the Commons
debated the 1938 treaty. In his contribution, Gretton claimed it was
an indefensible bargain and arrangement. Commercially there is nothing to
be said for it, and ﬁnancially the arrangement is ludicrous and indefensible.
As regards Defence, we are admittedly giving up everything, and there is
nothing to be set on paper or even an assurance given to this House that we
are getting anything in exchange.106
Croft’s intervention was markedly different: ‘I am so largely in favour of
thewide scope of the peace promotion of theGovernment in Europe at the
present time.’ And in an implicit rebuke of Churchill, Croft urged critics
to direct their anger to the 1921 treaty.107
The contrasting positions adopted by diehards on relations with Spain
and Italy were also connected to concern about Germany, inasmuch as
neither side wanted to encourage alliances between Berlin, Madrid and
Rome. Unlike British–Irish relations, however, these were differences of
emphasis rather than outright disagreement. Whereas Croft was General
Franco’s ‘noisiest supporter’, Gretton chose not to endorse him.108 In a
Commons division on 25 June 1937, called by Labour to challenge the
government’s controversial approach to non-intervention, Croft backed
the government. Gretton, in contrast, abstained, distinguishing himself
from Labour by criticizing the League and demanding a policy of active
neutrality on the part of the British government:
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We have not tried the orthodox, regular, clear policy of recognising both
sides as belligerents and acting as a neutral Power . . . We should then be
able to play our part even in restraining supplies of munitions of war. Our
policy would be clearly understood by every nation and every Government
in the world.109
Likemost British observers, of course, Gretton understood that neutrality
undermined Franco’s opponents, but as with his attitude to Europe more
generally, Gretton rationalized his stance in the language of British self-
interest.
The division between Croft and Gretton on Italy was more subtle
again. Only two of the ‘core diehards’, Churchill and Courtauld, opposed
the 1938 Anglo-Italian Agreement, though they were joined by seven
additional ‘India diehards’, including the duchess of Atholl.110 One of
Gretton’s criticisms of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was that
it undermined the Stresa Front, also signed in 1935, though in keeping
with his focus on British self-interest, he failed to comment on Italian
and French concerns.111 Speaking in a Commons debate in the middle
of the Abyssinian crisis, Gretton criticized both the opposition and the
government for basing their policies on the League, and claimed that the
burden would fall on the British and French navies.112 Croft supported the
government during the crisis, and took this further than others by actively
refuting widespread claims that the British public had bombarded their
MPs with letters of protest.113 Churchill’s otherwise brief interventions in
this debate are notable for his challenge to Croft’s claim that the Italian
conquest of Abyssinia was an established fact. The latter brushed this
aside, saying that he could not sympathize with a country which allowed
the killing of British subjects inKenya and that practised the slave trade.114
IV
From the remilitarization of the Rhineland through to the Munich
agreement, diehard MPs were preoccupied with opposing colonial
restitution. With the exception of the debates outlined above, in section
III, they did not publicly address developments in Germany. Throughout
this period, few would have doubted the diehards’ patriotism, but as war
with Germany appeared increasingly likely towards the end of 1938, and
the pressure to appease Germany in directions other than the colonies
mounted, Croft and his supporters had to tread carefully in justifying
agreements with Hitler.115 Like the government, Croft felt obliged to
denounce the brutality of the Anschluss, although he accompanied
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this, characteristically, with a condemnation of Labour’s support for
disarmament.116 The Commons had no extensive opportunity to discuss
British–German relations until the start of October 1938, when, in a
dramatic reversal, it debated the Munich Agreement over four days.
Churchill, Croft and Raikes were the only diehards from the core cohort
to speak. Churchill’s contribution, on the third day of the debate, is
well known. Croft’s ﬁrst contribution came on the ﬁrst day, when his
interruption of Duff Cooper’s resignation speech expressed the irritation
of many at the consequent delay to Chamberlain’s statement.117 Croft’s
more substantial contribution came on the third day, and immediately
followed Churchill. He began by regretting that the two men should
disagree, having worked together ‘on so many causes’. Croft rejected
the charge that Britain had ‘suffered total and unmitigated defeat’. He
broke also with Chamberlain by expressing regret at the pledge given to
Czechoslovakia: ‘I have always felt that we have burdens enough in our
present commitments, and ought not to go meddling in the distant parts
of Central Europe.’ But his speech was essentially supportive of the prime
minister’s policy. Croft argued that there were now two schools of thought.
The ﬁrst says that: ‘We cannot have any conversations or intercourse, and
certainly no agreement, with dictators; we differ from them, their form of
government and their methods.’ The second realizes ‘that the dictatorial
form of Government has now existed in a great many countries for many
years’. He went on to justify dealing with dictators:
there is no evidence of any great uprising of the people in those countries
where they are subject to dictatorships, and, since you cannot wait for all
this great range of countries to eliminate their ﬁrmly-established dictators,
if the machinery of civilisation is still to work you have got to understand
their mentality, you have got to work with them, and, if possible, you have
got to reach agreement . . . or we have to ﬁght them ultimately.
Croft believed that Germany was ready to invade the Sudetenland, and
that Britain’s inability to prevent this militarily meant that it had no
alternative but to reach an agreement. Conscription would take half a
year to implement properly, and a naval blockade would require a ‘long
time’ to bring about the necessary conditions of ‘starvation’. An air war,
he reasoned, based on Churchill’s ﬁgures, would not result in immediate
victory. In response to an interruption, which suggested assistance from
the Soviet Union, Croft made the uncharacteristic admission that ‘I am
the last person to want in any way to criticise a country which might have
come to our common aid at that time’, before doubting it could mobilize
fast enough, and highlighting problems within the Soviet forces.118
Raikes’s speech, two days before Churchill and Croft, was the ﬁrst
from the Conservative backbenches. He pre-empted Croft’s argument
116 House of Commons Debates, 14 March 1938, vol. 333, cols 72–3.
117 Ibid., 3 October 1938, vol. 339, cols 29–40; John Charmley, Duff Cooper: The Authorised
Biography (London, 1997), p. 127.
118 House of Commons Debates, 5 October 1938, vol. 339, cols 374–83.
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by remarking that: ‘War might have been waged in revenge for
Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment, but Czechoslovakia knewwell that the
brunt of that war would tear their State to pieces before a single step
could be taken to stop it.’ He then brusquely dismissed concerns about
the shortness of the time limit for Jews and Social Democrats to leave
the Sudetenland, contending that they had ‘known for weeks . . . that
they were in danger from a German occupation and that they would
have been wiped out when that occupation took place’. Raikes blamed
the Czechoslovakian government for annexing the Sudetenland before
it was ratiﬁed by the Paris Peace Conferences, and for taking twenty
years to grant rights to the Sudeten Germans. He compared criticisms
of Chamberlain to those which greeted Benjamin Disraeli following the
1874 Treaty of Berlin, and concluded that ‘our leader will go down to
history as the greatest European statesman of this or any other time.’119
Little wonder Amery noted in his diary that Raikes had ‘blessed’ the
government position.120 It is therefore remarkable that Raikes abstained
from the division called on 6 October to support the Munich Agreement.
As no explanation was offered, it is not clear if his hitherto consistent
support for Chamberlain faltered on this occasion.121 He was certainly
present for the division which immediately preceded, to vote against a
Labour amendment. Whatever the explanation, Raikes joined Gretton
and nine other ‘India diehards’ in abstaining on the crucial division to
support the government.122
In the months that followed, Raikes returned to defending the
government, against the criticism made by Churchill and others that
it should enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union.123 When the
Commons debated the Czechoslovakian crisis of March 1939, Viscount
Wolmer was the only diehard called to address the Commons. The MP
for Aldershot acknowledged that he was a critic of the government,
and censured Chamberlain for his claim that ‘he was not going to relax
his efforts to preserve the peace of Europe . . . Is it proper, legitimate,
right and sensible to describe the state of Europe to-day as one of
peace[?]’. Wolmer supported Eden’s calls for all parties to set aside their
differences, but went further than the timid dissidence of the former
foreign secretary by recommending the formation of ‘a real National
Government’ committed to national service. Wolmer believed that this
was the only message capable of being understood by a ‘dictator state’.124
119 Ibid., 3 October 1938, vol. 339, cols 94–7.
120 Leopold Amery, diary, 3 Oct. 1938, Empire at Bay, p. 525.
121 Amery, diary, 17 March 1936, Empire at Bay, p. 411; Henry Channon, diary, 2 Aug. 1939, Robert
Rhodes James (ed.), Chips: The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon (London, 1993), p. 207.
122 House of Commons Debates, 6 Oct. 1938, vol. 339, cols 558–61. The other nine were the Duchess
of Atholl, Brendan Bracken, Winston Churchill, John Courtauld, William Davison, Roger Keyes,
John Lees-Jones, Thomas Somerset, and Viscount Wolmer.
123 House of Commons Debates, 19 May 1939, vol. 347, cols 1850–5; Raikes criticized Churchill’s
association with Labour on foreign policy, see Thompson, Anti-Appeasers, p. 171, citing House of
Commons Debates, 25 May 1938, vol. 336, col. 1294.
124 House of Commons Debates, 15 March 1939, vol. 345, 465–7.
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Croft responded to the crisis by writing to The Times, associating
himself with calls by former service chiefs that the country should
concentrate its ‘main purpose on producing the maximum punching
power against an aggressor’. He took the opportunity to blame the crisis
on ‘the whole psychology of political leadership of all parties during the
last few years’, and singled out Baldwin’s famous claim that there was
no defence against air attack, accusing him of playing the game of the
enemy by encouraging ﬂight to shelter rather than the need to ﬁght.125 On
31 March, The Times published another letter from Croft, condemning
critics of Chamberlain, in particular Eden, who called for national unity
but tabled a motion critical of the government. Chamberlain, Croft
boasted, had brought about a ‘miraculous change’ in the ‘defence and
spirit of the people’, when three years previously ‘we were suffering from
a poisonous attitude of paciﬁsm and a yielding to a complete psychology
of defeat.’126 Croft nevertheless echoed Wolmer’s demand for national
service, claiming that he was a ‘recent convert’.127
When parliament was recalled after the summer recess in 1939, to
hear the prime minister’s announcement that war had been declared on
Germany, Croft was the only diehard to address the House of Commons.
He declared that he spoke on behalf of the ‘old Tories’, and signalled his
peace with Churchill, who had just been brought into the government
as First Lord of the Admiralty. Brieﬂy reﬂecting on a political career
promoting imperial unity, Croft sidestepped recent divisions by expressing
his pride that in the ‘great Dominions overseas to-day hearts are pulsating
for liberty and freedom in precisely the same way as in the old land.’128
Despite calls for unity between the parties, rifts in the Conservative
Party and diehard ranks widened and fractured again, exacerbated by
the uncertainty and pessimism about war aims and strategy generated
by the ‘bore war’. At the party Central Council on 4 April 1940, Adam
Maitland, an ‘India diehard’ and supporter of appeasement, proposed
a measure calling for national unity, which others regarded as curbing
criticism of the government. Prominent critics of appeasement, Vyvyan
Adams and Richard Law, ensured a less restrictive motion was passed
instead.129 The divisions amongst diehards were more obvious at the
famous Norway debate on 7 and 8 May 1940. Early on, Sir Roger Keyes,
one of the India diehards, condemned his government, comparing the
Norway debacle with the disastrous assault on Gallipoli during the Great
War. As the admiral was one of the very few India diehards to follow
Churchill in the late 1930s, it is signiﬁcant that he criticized naval policy
125 The Times, 18 March 1939, p. 8.
126 Ibid., 31 March 1939, p. 10.
127 Ibid., 28 April 1939, p. 8. Thompson cites Croft’s memoirs in which he retrospectively argued
that the seizure of Prague was ‘the turning point in our times’, Croft, Life of Strife, p. 294, cited in
Thompson, Anti-Appeasers, p. 201.
128 House of Commons Debates, 3 Sept. 1939, vol. 351, cols 300–1.
129 The Times, 5 April 1940, p. 5.
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in this manner.130 As a member of the government, Churchill was not
among the diehards who deﬁed the party whips on the crucial vote of
conﬁdence on 8 May. Another diehard, Courtauld, also ended his record
of abstentions by supporting Chamberlain, without indicating why his
position had changed since Munich. Of the core diehard cohort, six
abstained and two went further by voting against their government.131
In the larger cohort of India diehards, fourteen abstained and four voted
against the government.132
The core diehard MP, Sir William Davison, who abstained on Munich
and did so again on Norway, made a number of interruptions during
the two-day debate, all directed at Labour speakers. But the only
substantial diehard contribution came from Croft.133 He defended the
government at great length; indeed, Amery suggests that calling Croft to
speak was intended to kill the debate.134 The Bournemouth MP caused
considerable controversy by blaming the present crisis on articles in the
press, which encouraged ‘despondency among our people because of some
temporary setbacks’, and criticized MPs for devoting too much of their
energies to ‘social problems’ rather than fostering the ‘offensive spirit’
which was necessary to win the war.135 These remarks prompted some
Labour MPs to leave the chamber.136 Croft’s speech went on, at some
length, to deal with the problems faced by the British army. It is likely that
his determined and consistent posture on the need to address these issues
went some way to securing him ministerial office, as under-secretary of
state for war, following Churchill’s replacement of Chamberlain. Wolmer
also received a junior ministerial appointment, and from the India cohort
of diehards, Churchill’s close friend, Bracken, was placed in charge of the
Ministry of Information.137
V
Historians have tended to examine right-wing British responses to Hitler
on the basis of a supposed admiration or political affinity for Nazism.
This assumes more about diehard Conservatism than it understands.
Rather than a dilemma between sympathy for Nazism and concerns
130 House of Commons Debates, 7 May 1940, vol. 360, cols 1125–30.
131 Ibid., 8 May 1940, vol. 360, cols 1364–5. In addition to Gretton and Davison, four others, who
had not before abstained, were prepared to do so on this occasion: Charles Emmott, Lindsay Everard,
Howard Gritten, and Reginald Purbrick, none of whom addressed the two day debate.
132 House of CommonsDebates, 8May 1940, vol. 360, cols 1364–5.Wolmer as well as Admiral Keyes
voted against the government, and were joined by Alfred Roy Wise, a diehard supporter of Munich.
133 Ibid., 7 May 1940, vol. 360, col. 1088; 8 May 1940, vol. 360, cols 1291–2.
134 Amery, diary, 7 May 1940, Empire at Bay, p. 592.
135 House of Commons Debates, 7 May 1940, vol. 360, cols 1106–7. See also Daily Mirror, 17 April
1940, p. 2.
136 HaroldNicolson, diary, 7May 1940, inNigel Nicolson (ed.),HaroldNicolson: Diaries and Letters,
1939–1945 (London, 1967), p. 76.
137 Wolmer’s opposition to Chamberlain was criticized by local constituency members, see, Parker,
Churchill, p. 192.
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about German threats to Britain’s global position, the dilemma that
actually split diehards was between challenging Germany before it was
too late, and a conviction that Britain lacked the means to do so. Both
positions were predicated on a belief that Britain needed to accelerate
rearmament, and that Nazi Germany posed a direct threat to British
power. Ideology is not irrelevant, but the public statements and actions
of diehard MPs reveal that their primary motivation, as it had been since
the early 1900s, was to resist internal and external threats to Britain’s
position as a world power. This resulted in an unprecedented division in
diehard ranks, over Chamberlain’s foreign policy, though diehard unity
on colonial appeasement recalled an older tradition of working together
in defence of the empire. If Chamberlain had a successful track record in
outmanoeuvring or ignoring critics of appeasement, then diehard MPs,
alongside other Conservative critics of colonial appeasement, succeeded
in doing something beyond the ability of others by limiting what the
prime minister could offer Germany.138 This is a reminder that political
history and diplomatic history should not just be the study of those taking
decisions, but ought also to consider their reliance on parliamentarians
for endorsement in the legislature, and supporters across the country for
moral authority.
138 Ibid., p. 129.
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